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ALAR KILP1
ESTONIA: RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATION 
RESTRICTIONS OF SAME-SEX COUPLE RELIGIOUS RIGHTS
Until the mid-20th century, same-sex couples’ rights were not publicly 
discussed. Mainstream Christian churches considered homosexuality a sin, 
and traditionally Christian cultures did not recognize same-sex partnerships as 
families or marriages. States categorized homosexual acts as criminal behavior, 
and religious authorities considered homosexuality “shameful, even sinful.”2 
In this context, religious institutions commanded significant social and cultural 
authority because public laws (as did society in general) reflected religious 
norms regarding sexuality, family and marriage.
Since the mid-20th century, religious institutions’ authority over the social 
definition of marriage has been challenged in three dimensions. These chal-
lenges come legally, by the liberalization of laws regulating sexuality and 
marriage;3 socially, by changes in popular preferences and lifestyle choices;4 
and religiously, through religious internal secularization,5 whereby religious 
associations adapt to liberal values predominant in the secular culture.
For Christian churches, the issue at stake does not concern changes at the 
levels of religious affiliation, belief, and practice, or in religious deinstitution-
alization. Rather, the question is whether the traditional moral norms regulating 
gender and sexuality are being followed socially, whether the authoritative 
1 Alar Kilp – PhD, Institute of Government and Politics, University of Tartu, Estonia.
2 Immanuel Wallerstein, “Render Unto Caesar? The Dilemmas of a Multicultural World”, 
Sociology of Religion, 66(2) (2005), 122.
3 Jytte Klausen, “Why religion has become more salient in Europe: four working hypotheses 
about secularization and religiosity in contemporary politics”, European Political Science 8(3) 
(2009), 292, 296.
4 Guy Ben Porat, Between State and Synagogue: The Secularization of Contemporary Israel 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2013), 24.
5 Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press 1994), 22.
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representation of traditional church values is culturally acknowledged, and 
whether the law endorses traditional norms. Hence this issue also pertains 
to the extent to which the church has social authority over those members 
of society who are “not churchgoing,” “not believing,” and “not believing in 
belonging”6 but consider important religious services such as christenings, 
marriages and funerals as “rites of passage.” The last mentioned social segment 
includes “national atheists” and “national traditionalists” for whom national 
religious traditions, rites and rituals are a means of connecting to the national 
community.7 They may not acknowledge the religious authority of the church, 
but may approve of the church’s political and cultural role.
The interplay of the above-mentioned dimensions determines the degree 
to which society preserves traditional conceptions of “family” and “marriage.” 
Laws recognizing multiple non-traditional family structures and changes in 
individual sexual behavior challenge church authority over traditional norms. 
The disagreement among church leadership and membership over the liberaliza-
tion of marriage-related norms encourages the liberalization of the family law.
Thus, the degree to which the legal norms undermine or support opera-
tive church norms conditions the church’s social authority. However, it is 
also possible that the secularized state supports traditionalist norms without 
acknowledging the Christian churches’ social authority. For example, after the 
Soviet Union criminalized homosexuality between 1933 and 1934,8 the estab-
lished social norms originated from the Communist Party’s social authority 
rather than from Christian churches because the Soviet Union’s atheist ideology 
did not publicly recognize Christian churches’ norms.
In both the predominantly post-industrial West and socioeconomically less 
advanced, post-communist East, European cultures have moved away from 
the “traditional norms that regulated the institution of marriage, the relations 
of gender and the norms of sexuality”9 by following different patterns and 
timings.10 In Western Europe, the turning point in the relationship between 
6 Lisbet Christoffersen, “Intertwinement: A New Concept for Understanding Religion-Law 
Relations”, Nordic Journal of Religion and Society, 19(2) (2006), 118.
7 Eileen Barker, “But who’s going to win? National and minority religions in post-communist 
society”, Philosophy and Sociology 2(6) (1999), 62-63.
8 Helen Zorgdrager, “Homosexuality and hypermasculinity in the public discourse of the 
Russian Orthodox Church: an affect theoretical approach”, International Journal of Philosophy 
and Theology 74(3) (2013), 219.
9 Jytte Klausen, “Why religion has become”, 291, 194.
10 Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004), 112-127.
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Christianity and the laws relating to homosexuality occurred in the 1960s and 
1970s.11 In Eastern Europe, the public debates over the legal norms regulating 
sexuality and marriage started in the 1990s and intensified in most countries 
in the beginning of the 21st century. Among the post-communist countries that 
joined the European Union in 2004 and thereafter, the domestic interpretations 
of the related European norms influenced the public debates over recognition 
for same-sex couples.
The Domestic Impact of Euro-Secularism
On the one hand, the European Union grants autonomy to its member states 
to regulate religious affairs at the national level.12 Correspondingly, the Euro-
pean law on religion recognizes both those national systems with established 
churches as well as those founded upon the principle of the separation of church 
and state. On the other hand, however, European institutions (particularly the 
European Union and the European Court of Human Rights) monitor and limit 
national laws on religion and church-state relations.
The European Union’s “religion law” – or, as phrased by Norman Doe, 
the European Union’s “common law” on religion – is guided by a set of 
principles. These include “the value of religion,” “cooperation with religion,” 
“the special protection of religion” by means of privileges and exemptions, 
subsidiarity (i.e., the principle that religious affairs are primarily regulated by 
each member state at their own national level), “the autonomy of religious 
associations,’ “religious equality” (and non-discrimination), and “religious 
freedom.”13 In legal and political practice, these principles interact so that 
those tending to protect majority rights are balanced with the others protecting 
minority and individual rights. For example, principles such as “the value of 
religion,” “cooperation with religion,” and “the special protection of religion” 
predominantly favor the traditional and numerically largest religious confes-
sions. Conversely, principles such as “religious freedom,” “state neutrality,” 
and “religious equality” tend to limit (religious) majority rights in favor of 
(religious) minorities and individuals.
11 Hugh Macleod,“Introduction” [in] Hugh Macleod and Werner Ustorf, eds., The Decline of 
Christendom in Western Europe, 1750-2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003), 3.
12 Norman Doe, Law and Religion in Europe: A Comparative Introduction (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2011), 30.
13 Norman Doe, Law and Religion in Europe, 238-251.
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European institutions therefore accept national variations in religion law 
as legitimate. For example, the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHRFF) proclaims that a national law may limit 
rights to freedom of religion and religious practices. According to Article 9 of 
the ECHRFF, the rights to freedom of religion and religious practices “shall 
be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary 
in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of 
public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others.”14 In reality, however, European institutions also contribute to 
a harmonization of the national religion laws.15 Because cultural and social 
harmonization is largely beyond the reach of European institutions, these 
efforts are predominantly legal. The legal harmonization is guided by the type 
of secularism promoted by European institutions (Euro-secularism) which 
emphasizes:
1. the separation of religion and politics, particularly the exclusion of 
“autonomous religious influence from political and social choices;”16
2. privatization of religion, which restricts religion to the private sphere 
and narrows space for “sacred values” in society and culture;17 and
3. the protection of individual religious freedom.18
In the policy area of “moral issues,” the European Union is strongly 
committed to individual autonomy.19 An emphasis on individual choices over 
collective rights is in accordance with the legal reforms regulating sexuality 
in the largest EU member-states, which have significantly weakened clerical 
control over personal decisions.20 Julian Rivers has even suggested that “a 
new establishment” has been emerging within the EU in recent decades; this 
has led to elevated respect for the choice of an individual to determine sexual 
identity and has replaced the heterosexist patriarchy with an ethic of gender 
14 Article 9.2, European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950). 
15 Rik Torfs, “The Religion–State Relationship in Europe”, The Review of Faith & Interna-
tional Affairs, 8(2) (2010), 16.
16 John McCormick, Europeanism (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010), 175-182.
17 Jytte Klausen, “Why religion has become”, 294.
18 Jose Casanova, “The Problem of Religion and the anxieties of European secular democ-
racy” [in] Gabriel Motzkin and Yochi Fischer, eds., Religion and Democracy in Contemporary 
Europe (London: Alliance Publishing Trust 2008), 64, 67.
19 Ronan McCrea, Religion and the Public Order of the European Union (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2010), 10.
20 Jytte Klausen, “Why religion has become”, 292.
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equality.21 As a result, intolerance of religious ethics considered incompatible 
with the new set of secular values has increased, while the legitimate scope 
of religious autonomy for churches adopting a different ethic in the realm of 
sexual orientation has diminished.22 As a result, the degree to which the new 
norm of equality among sexual orientations becomes part of the European 
public sphere is the degree to which the religious autonomy of churches 
following a contrasting ethic becomes a controversial theme in public debates. 
In post-communist Europe, where no state has legally recognized same-sex 
marriage, and in the post-Soviet region, where no state has even legally recog-
nized same-sex partnership, the public debates focus on legal recognition of 
same-sex families rather than on religious autonomy. Questions about religious 
autonomy for associations which do not recognize same-sex families are 
typically not publicly debated until the legal recognition of same-sex families 
has either materialized or become highly likely.
Religious Recognition of Same-Sex Families
The religious recognition of same-sex families occurs when religious institu-
tions provide rituals such as religious marriage and other services on an 
equal basis to both hetero- and homosexual couples, and when religious 
institutions do not discriminate amongst their members on the basis of their 
sexual orientation. Unlike legal recognition, which depends on the will of the 
national parliament, religious recognition is primarily dependent on the will 
of the religious leadership.
For example, the Lutheran Churches in Scandinavian societies have 
a degree of autonomy in deciding the limits of the religious rights of homo-
sexuals among their membership. In both Denmark and Sweden, the Lutheran 
Churches started to provide religious same-sex marriages shortly after their 
respective parliaments legalized same-sex marriage. Same-sex marriage is 
also legal in Norway, but the Church of Norway does not marry same-sex 
couples. Therefore it can be argued that homosexual religious rights are more 
limited in Norway than in Denmark not because of state laws, but because of 
the internal regulations of the dominant church.
21 Julian Rivers, “Law, Religion and Gender Equality”, Ecclesiastical Law Journal, 9 (2007), 
24, 33.
22 Rivers, “Law, Religion and Gender Equality”, 38, 41.
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The Position of European Institutions regarding Legal Recognition of 
Same-Sex Families
As they decide about the legal status of same-sex families the parliaments of the 
post-communist member states of the EU are to some degree also influenced by 
European institutions. Since about 2010, the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) and the European Union began to expect all contracting states of the 
Council of Europe and member states of the EU to protect the family life of 
same-sex couples in some form or another on an equal basis with heterosexual 
couples – albeit without mandating that the states legalize same-sex marriage. 
The European Union’s commitment to a principle whereby all human rights 
apply to homosexuals as they apply to heterosexuals is explicitly articulated 
in the 2013 “Guidelines to Promote and Protect the Enjoyment of All Human 
Rights by Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex (LGBTI) Persons” 
which says:
“LGBTI persons have the same rights as all other individuals – no new human rights 
are created for them and none should be denied to them. The EU is committed to the 
principle of the universality of human rights and reaffirms that cultural, traditional or 
religious values cannot be invoked to justify any form of discrimination, including 
discrimination against LGBTI persons.”23
In Schalk and Kopf v Austria (2010) the ECtHR recognized the right of 
same-sex couples to family life, and expected some form of legal recogni-
tion of same-sex relationships in all contracting states of the Council of 
Europe. The Court did not expect the states to have uniform same-sex union 
laws, but clearly proclaimed that the states are obliged to provide legal 
recognition for same-sex couples and their family lives.24 In Vallianatos 
and Others v. Greece (2013), the Court elaborated its position and held that 
a Greek civil union law that did not extend to same-sex couples violated 
the European Convention on Human Rights by unjustified discrimination 
between heterosexual and homosexual couples. In like manner, the European 
Parliament expects all member states to recognize same-sex families, and 
23 The Council of the European Union, “Guidelines to Promote and Protect the Enjoyment 
of All Human Rights by Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex (LGBTI) Persons”, 
24 June 2013, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/
foraff/137584.pdf [14.04.2015].
24 Jens M. Scherpe, “The Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Couples in Europe and the Role 
of the European Court of Human Rights”, The Equal Rights Review 10 (2013), 91-92.
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condemns policies of member states that exclude same-sex couples from the 
definition of “family.”25
Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Cohabitation by the Estonian 
Parliament
The perceived shift in the institutional positions of the ECtHR and the EU 
has also influenced the ideological positions of Estonian MPs. After Schalk 
and Kopf v Austria (2010), the Estonian parliament began to acknowledge 
that European institutions were expecting it to grant same-sex couples some 
form of legal status. After the Vallianatos case, it became clear that the 
European Court of Human Rights would not endorse a Cohabitation Act 
if it only applied to heterosexual couples. Therefore, the Parliament opted 
for a gender-neutral Cohabitation Act which grants same- and opposite-sex 
couples the right to formally enter into a cohabitation contract covering issues 
related to property, inheritance, and care obligations toward each other.26 In 
2009, a draft of this act was included in the agenda of the Estonian Parliament 
and its Government. Until 2014, however, the draft did not find sufficient 
support from the government which included the national and conservative 
Pro Patria and the Res Publica Union. The situation changed on 26 March 
2014, when the liberal-right Reform Party and the Social Democrats formed 
a new government. The Social Democrats were the only parliamentary party 
that had articulated (as early as 2009) straightforward support for the legal 
recognition of same-sex couples.
On 9 October 2014, the Estonian Parliament passed the gender-neutral 
Cohabitation Act, which legally recognizes the lifestyle choices of both same-
sex and opposite-sex unmarried couples through registered partnership, with 
40 votes in favor and 38 votes against. The Act entered into force on 1 January 
2016; in the interim period the Parliament had passed related implementing 
provisions which required the support of an absolute parliamentary majority 
(51 out of 101).
25 The European Parliament (2012), “The European Parliament resolution of 24 May 2012 
on the fight against homophobia in Europe”, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/
getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2012-222 [15.04.2015].
26 Andra Olm, “Non-married Cohabiting Couples and Their Constitutional Right to Family 
Life”, Juridica International 20 (2013), 109.
Alar Kilp
91
The proposed Cohabitation Act includes same-sex cohabitations as legally 
recognized and protected family types, but does not change the current Estonian 
legislation on marriage. The Estonian Family Law Act defines marriage as 
a contract between a man and a woman, and considers a marriage void when 
formed between persons of the same sex. Therefore, when the Cohabitation Act 
entered into force in 2016, heterosexual marriage became one of the legally 
recognized forms of family. The Estonian political elite initiated and supported 
the Cohabitation Act, while the religious elite (leaders of the dominant religious 
organizations) have explicitly condemned and rejected it.
Re-Definition of “The Family”
Proponents of the Cohabitation Act – including the President of Estonia, 
Toomas Hendrik Ilves – argue that the bill was needed because behavioral 
choices among the Estonian population already testify to a changed meaning 
of the term “family” (e.g., about 60% of all children are born out of wedlock, 
that is to say, to unmarried mothers). In contrast, Estonian churches are worried 
about the negative outcomes of the Cohabitation Act on the normative status 
of traditional marriage. On 23 May 2014, the United Methodist Church in 
Estonia published a statement arguing that the experience of other countries 
demonstrates that a cohabitation bill, rather than being the ultimate aim of those 
who propose such, is only an intermediate phase before a radical reinterpreta-
tion of marriage and the family. Similarly, an address by the Estonian Orthodox 
Church of the Moscow Patriarchy to the Estonian Parliament regarding the 
Cohabitation Bill (13 May 2014) disapproved of legalizing the cohabitation of 
same-sex couples because it would make their relationship “practically equal 
with marriage.”27 It is highly likely that the Cohabitation Act will redraw the 
boundaries of legitimate family forms and transform common sense under-
standings of “the family” among the Estonian population. This possibility has 
alarmed all Estonian churches.
27 The Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchy, “Moskva Patriarhaadi Eesti 
Õigeusu Kiriku Täiskogu pöördumine Riigikogule seoses kooseluseaduse eelnõu 650 SE 
arutamisega” [The address of the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchy to the 
Parliament regarding the discussion of the Cohabitation Act 650 SE], available at: http://www.
orthodox.ee/314est.html [15.04.2015].
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Religious Autonomy
Churches in Estonia are also worried that, after the Cohabitation Act’s adoption, 
they will be forced to adjust their religious messages and services so that these 
neither condemn homosexual lifestyles nor discriminate in church membership 
on the basis of sexual orientation. The churches also worry that, unless they 
change and conform – which they are unwilling to do – they will be accused of 
“incitement of hatred” or of discrimination. On 22 August 2012, the Archbishop 
of the Estonian Evangelical Lutheran Church, Andres Põder, argued in his 
letter to the Minister of Justice that the majority of religious associations in 
Estonia forbids behaviors which are legally regulated, such as abortion and 
sexual relations outside marriage or with a person of the same gender. The 
Archbishop was worried that, when laws recognize same-sex cohabitation, 
these essential beliefs of Estonian religious tradition may be interpreted as 
“hate speech” or discrimination.
The same concern has been voiced by the Council of Estonian Churches28 
which represents not only the numerically largest and historic Christian 
denominations of Estonia, but also those of more recent origin: the Estonian 
Evangelical Lutheran Church, the Union of Evangelical Christian and Baptist 
Churches of Estonia, the Estonian Methodist Church, the Roman Catholic 
Church, the Estonian Christian Pentecostal Church, the Estonian Conferences 
of the Seventh-Day Adventists Church, the St. Gregory Estonian Congregation 
of the Armenian Apostolic Church, the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church, 
the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchy, and the Charismatic 
Episcopal Church of Estonia. On 28 September 2012, the Council of Estonian 
Churches (CEC) published its “Position on the Draft of the Cohabitation 
Act.”29 It argued that when religious ministers publicly articulate positions 
stemming from their church’s doctrine regarding a homosexual lifestyle during 
a religious service, in the media, or in public, they cannot be certain whether 
persons with different viewpoints would consider this a systematic incitement 
to hatred or discrimination.
The document added that the member churches of the CEC cannot support 
the legalization of same-sex cohabitation because a homosexual lifestyle is 
28 www.ekn.ee [12.04.2015]
29 Council of Estonian Churches, “Eesti Kirikute Nõukogu seisukoht Kooseluseaduse 
kontseptsiooni kohta” [The position of the Council of Estonian Churches on the concept of 




a sin before God, and sins and vices cannot be justified or legally recognized. 
This position remained a constant part of public statements by the CEC and 
its individual member churches during the intensified public debate over the 
Cohabitation Act during the summer and autumn of 2014. For example, on 
4 October 2014, Metropolitan Stephanus of the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox 
Church argued that “[…] homosexual relationships are not positively supported 
by any biblical text. Theologians, who argue contrariwise, ignore the Bible.”30 
On 11 September 2014, when the involved parties were invited to discuss 
the Cohabitation Act in the Legal Affairs Committee of the Estonian Parlia-
ment, the CEC representative was asked to comment on how churches like 
the Church of Sweden cope with situations where same-sex cohabitation is 
legally recognized and socially accepted. The CEC representative responded 
with a statement saying that toleration of same-sex cohabitation is an absolute 
minority viewpoint in the Christian world. Therefore, the Estonian churches 
are not siding with the (Lutheran) churches of Scandinavia, with respect to 
either religious or public policy dimensions, where Parliaments have legalized 
same-sex marriage with partial or full support of churches.
In the CEC’s view, traditional European values do not support the 
rights of same-sex couples. On 30 April 2014, in an address to the Estonian 
Parliament on the cohabitation bill, the CEC argued that its adoption may 
evoke a serious security threat because it divides Estonian society; it also 
forces non-Estonians who do not agree with the abandonment of traditional 
European values to seek support from a “cultural area and state” where 
marriage and family are continually honored as sacrosanct.31 The address 
did not identify the particulars of such a “cultural area and state” in which 
marriage and family are honored, but it is most likely that the CEC was not 
referring to the Lutheran Churches of Scandinavia. Already in March 2007, 
in reaction to the decision of the Swedish (Lutheran) Church to bless same-
sex couples in church services, the Archbishop of the Estonian Evangelical 
Lutheran Church, Andres Põder, argued that homosexual behavior is a sin 
and that blessing a same-sex partnership is inconceivable in the Estonian 
30 Metropoliit Stefanus: EAÕK soovib kooseluseaduse teemal sisulisemat arutelu [Metro-
politan Stephanus: Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church requests a more substantive debate over 
the Cohabitation Act], Postimees, 4 October 2014, available at: http://www.postimees.ee/2942969/
metropoliit-stefanus-eaok-soovib-kooseluseaduse-teemal-sisulisemat-arutelu [14.04.2015].
31 Council of Estonian Churches, “Arvamus kooseluseaduse eelnõu 650 SE I kohta” [Opinion 
regarding the Cohabitation Bill 650 SE I], 30 April 2014, available at: http://www.ekn.ee/doc/
uudised/Kiri_Riigikogule_2904_RL.pdf [14.04.2015].
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Lutheran Church.32 As far as the rights of homosexual couples are concerned, 
the Estonian Lutheran Church seems to side with the Orthodox Christian 
churches rather than with the Lutherans of Scandinavia.
Autonomy of the Estonian State from Religion
According to Lisbet Christoffersen, the mutual autonomy of church and state – 
the autonomy of the state from religion and the autonomy of a religion from the 
state – is framed and formed by “the theological (normative-religious) context,” 
“legal ordering of […] relations between [the] state and churches (religious 
denominations),” “basic constitutional values,” and “the common European 
legal norms, as they are understood and used in the concrete national context.”33
The Estonian state is significantly autonomous from religion. In Estonia, 
the Constitutional clause stipulating that “there is no state church” (Article 40) 
safeguards the process of political decision-making from clerical interference. 
As in all other European states,34 the Estonian state’s neutrality is manifested 
also in its autonomy from religious law. Similar to many other European states, 
Estonia recognizes two levels of religious organizations. At the top level, ten 
member churches of the Estonian Council of Churches enjoy privileged access 
to government and to state funds; they enjoy a relationship of partnership 
and dialogue with the state in fields like the media, education, chaplaincy, 
ecumenism, and international relations. However, this unequal (or privileged) 
treatment of some religious associations in and of itself does not violate the 
principles of democratic government “as long as there is no specific intent to 
support or hinder a specific religion,”35 and “religious freedom for others is 
guaranteed.”36
32 Anneli Ammas, “Eesti luteri kirik Rootsi eeskujul homoabielusid sõlmima ei hakka” [The 
Estonian Lutheran Church will not follow the Swedish example of same-sex weddings], Eesti 
Päevaleht, 27 March 2007.
33 Christoffersen, “Intertwinement”, 114.
34 Benyamin Neuberger, “Religion and State in Europe and Israel” [in] Reuven Hazan and 
Moshe Maor, eds., Parties, Elections and Cleavages: Israel in Comparative Perspective (London: 
Frank Cass 1999), 77.
35 Jonathan Fox, “Separation of Religion and State and Secularism in Theory and in Practice”, 
Religion, State and Society 39(4) (2011), 385-386.
36 Doe, Law and Religion in Europe, 40; Jeroen Temperman, State-Religion Relationships 
and Human Rights Law: Towards a Right to Religiously Neutral Governance (Leiden: Martinus 
Nihjoff Publishers 2010), 1.
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In the last decade, with the exception of the Cohabitation Act, there have 
been no significant conflicts between Estonia’s religious and political elites. 
The Estonian party system lacks the Christian parties which exist in Scandi-
navian parliaments and the Christian Democratic parties which are the major, 
conservative and pro-church parties in continental Western Europe. In Estonia, 
religious rhetoric is absent from daily politics or, when it is used, it is assumed 
that Christian values operating in Estonian politics are defined by the political 
elite and are represented by the ideological positions of all parliamentary 
parties.37 Against this background, the introduction of the Cohabitation Act 
empowers the state against Estonia’s dominant churches by establishing a new 
set of legally recognized family forms that do not correspond to the norms, 
will, or practice of the Christian churches.
Autonomy of the Church from the State
The Estonian Family Law does not recognize same-sex marriage but provides 
for a religious marriage on the condition that “an authorized clergyman can 
refuse to perform marriages if those being married oppose the conditions set 
to marriage by the confessions of the church, congregation, or association 
of congregations.”38 Against this background, the Cohabitation Act will not 
change the procedures for religious marriage. Unless the Parliament explic-
itly recognizes same-sex marriage, there exists no marriage-related conflict 
between church and state. Consequently, as far as marriage is concerned, 
preconditions for the debate over the “autonomy of the church from the state” 
are lacking.
A controversy over the “autonomy of the church from the state” is 
emerging regarding the religious rights of homosexual couples. In a context 
where literally all Christian churches only accept heterosexual families, 
homosexual couples have nowhere to practice their religious rights. The 
legitimate autonomy of religious organizations to not recognize homosexual 
couples among their membership while the state does recognize them has only 
become a real issue (and a public controversy) as of the day the Cohabitation 
Act entered into force.
37 Alar Kilp, “Patterns of Lutheran politics in a post-communist state: the case of Estonia”, 
Kultura i Polityka 6 (2009), 70-71.
38 Merilin Kiviorg, “Church and State in Estonia” [in] Silvio Ferrari and W. Cole Durham 
Jr., eds., Law and Religion in Post-Communist Europe (Leuven: Peeters 2003), 118.
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The autonomy of religious associations from the state is one of the funda-
mental cornerstones of democratic systems of government.39 In theory, full 
denial of religious association autonomy is a feature characterizing totalitarian 
regimes. Both ideologically atheistic40 as well as religiously theocratic forms 
of totalitarian government violate the autonomy of the individual conscience41 
and the autonomy of religious associations.42 Additionally, the right to religious 
autonomy is also fundamental for collective religious freedom, because “… 
there cannot be religious freedom for the communal side of religion unless the 
religious community qua community has autonomy.”43 In principle, neither the 
state nor the social majority can force Estonian Churches to open themselves 
up to homosexuals. Liberal democracies ought to grant religious associations 
autonomy to decide whether they will recognize same-sex families within 
their associations or not.
However, to the degree to which the equal treatment of citizens (irrespec-
tive of sexual orientation) becomes a culturally accepted norm, the harder 
it will be for religious associations to define the norms (texts, dogmas, and 
traditions) that earlier regulated sexuality among their membership in public 
debates as religious. Their religious definitions of sexuality are plausible 
within a Christian sub-culture that is no longer socially hegemonic. It is most 
likely that, once the Cohabitation Act entered into effect, “the religious rights 
of homosexuals” will be a legitimate theme of debate in the Estonian public 
sphere. Religious rejections of the religious rights of same-sex couples will 
become less plausible when the religious rights of same-sex couples per se 
are recognized as legitimate.
39 Tariq Modood, “Moderate Secularism, Religion as Identity and Respect for Religion”, 
The Political Quarterly 81(1) (2010), 8.
40 Donald E. Smith, “Religion and Political Modernization: Comparative Perspectives” [in] 
Donald E. Smith, ed., Religion and Political Modernization: Comparative Perspectives (London: 
Yale University Press 1974), 8.
41 Aldir Guedes Soriano, “Liberal Democracy and the Right to Religious Freedom”, Brigham 
Young University Law Review 3 (2013), 600.
42 W. Cole Durham Jr., “Patterns of Religion State Relations” [in] John Witte Jr. and M. Chris-
tian Green, eds., Religion and Human Rights: An Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2012), 360.
43 W. Cole Durham Jr., “The Right to Autonomy in Religious Affairs: A Comparative View” 




The Religious Rights of Same-Sex Couples
Does the freedom of religion apply to sexual minorities? Do homosexuals have 
religious rights? Heiner Bielefeldt argues that freedom of religion is based on 
the ability of human beings “to have and develop deep convictions in the first 
place.”44 To put it simply, homosexuals are human beings and they are capable 
of having deep convictions. Hence, one can hypothesize that same-sex couples 
have rights to religious freedom and to free exercise of religion as well.
When virtually all religious organizations deny the existence of a homo-
sexual identity (considering it a sin, vice or bad habit) and reject a homosexual 
lifestyle, then the free exercise of religion is inhibited for homosexuals. If 
religious associations do not open up to homosexuals, and the state grants 
religious associations autonomy to discriminate within their membership in 
a way which, if measured “against society-wide standards” may be judged 
as discriminatory,45 then should homosexuals then be free to leave existing 
religious associations to form a church of their own? This might be a working 
solution, but it is far from perfect. Ideally, discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation is eliminated best when sexual differences are depoliticized46 and 
become a non-issue.47 Similar to gender equality, which would not be achieved 
by the introduction of separate churches for men and women, discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation is best eliminated when either newly founded 
or traditional religious associations cease to distinguish between individuals 
on that basis. And when such a religious association emerges, the state has 
a duty to protect it from social intolerance.
44 Heiner Bielefeldt, “Freedom of Religion or Belief-A Human Right Under Pressure”, Oxford 
Journal of Law and Religion 1(1) (2012), 17.
45 John R. Bowen, “Religious Discrimination and Religious Governance Across Secular 
and Islamic Countries: France and Indonesia as Limiting Cases”, American Behavioral Scientist 
53(12) (2010), 1750.
46 Paul Mepschen and Jan Willem Duyvendak, “European Sexual Nationalisms: The Cultur-
alization of Citizenship and the Sexual Politics of Belonging and Exclusion”, Perspectives on 
Europe 41(1) (2012), 73.
47 Dan Kuwali, “Battle for Sex? Protecting Sexual(ity) Rights in Africa”, Human Rights 
Quarterly 36(1) (2014), 24.
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